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Introduction 
 
In recent years, security of energy supplies has re-emerged as a major policy concern. 
At the same time, there is a growing concern with regards to the physical and cyber 
security of critical infrastructure of strategic importance such as telecommunications, 
water supplies, transport systems, and energy supplies. Physical and virtual networks 
serve as the nerve system of critical infrastructures and, while vital for the functioning 
of these facilities, due to their geographic spread, they are vulnerable to natural disasters 
and malicious threats. As the modern economy are increasingly dependent on reliable 
but increasingly complex network infrastructures, the vulnerability of these and the cost 
of potential failure also increase. This chapter focuses on the economics, regulation, and 
policy aspect of the security of energy networks. 
 
Delivering Energy Network Security 
 
Economics of network security 
Energy networks are generally regarded as natural monopolies. This implies that the 
cost structure of these networks is such that their capital costs constitute a high portion 
of their total costs. This in turn results in declining average costs as the scale increases. 
As a result, it is more cost effective for a single network to serve the whole sector than 
by multiple competing firms. It then follows that, in the absence of competitive markets, 
these networks are, in the public interest, in public ownership or are subject to economic 
regulation.
3
 In most European countries, prior to the 1990s, the energy networks were in 
public ownership and under oversight of the relevant ministries. In the USA, the major 
network utilities have traditionally been privately owned and regulated by Public Utility 
Commissions (PUCs) or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
 
In economic terms, the decision problem with regards to provision of network security 
can be framed as the level of precaution required to minimize the total cost of the 
expected value of damage of security incidence. The expected value of damage can be 
viewed as a decreasing function of the product of probability of an incident occurring 
multiplied by the value of damage from the incident. This damage must then be 
weighed against the cost of undertaking precautionary efforts to prevent the incidence 
(as an increasing function of precaution). The economically point is then where the sum 
                                                          
1
 Tooraj Jamasb is Chair in Energy Economics at Durham University Business School and Co-Director of 
Durham Energy Institute. He can be contacted at Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, 
Durham DH1 3LB, UK. Email: tooraj.jamasb@durham.ac.uk. 
2
 Rabindra Nepal completed his PhD in Economics with a specialisation in Energy Economics as a 
James-Watt Scholar under the Scottish Graduate Program in Economics (SGPE). He has previously held 
appointments with Heriot-Watt University, UK and the University of Oklahoma, USA. He can be 
contacted at r.nepal@uq.edu.au. 
3
Armstrong, M., Cowan, S., and Vickers, S.J. (1994), ‘Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British 
Experience’, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.  
2 
 
of total costs of expected damage and those of precautionary efforts are minimised. It is, 
however, possible to deviate from this minimum efficient cost level for security, social, 
or other considerations. 
 
Incentive regulation for network security 
Since the 1990s, the economic regulation regimes in many countries have gradually 
shifted from cost-based regulation to incentive-based regulation models. Cost-based 
regulation covers the costs of a network utility plus a set rate of return. However, the 
incentive properties of this approach can in theory and in practice result in cost 
inefficiency and over-investments.
4
 Consequently, some sector regulators have adopted 
incentive based regulation models that reward input cost efficiency or quantity and 
quality of outputs.  
 
The theoretical and methodological advances in recent decades have enabled the sector 
regulators to adopt innovative incentive-based models for economic regulation of 
network utilities. Incentive regulation can be facilitated by the use of efficiency and 
productivity analysis techniques for benchmarking of network utilities and to reward or 
penalise cost and quality of service efficiency performance.
5
 In the absence of market 
mechanisms in the network sector, benchmarking is used to mimic a competitive market 
situation and to reduce information asymmetry between the sector regulators and the 
regulated firms.
6
 
 
The existing incentive-based regulation and utility benchmarking models can be adapted 
and modified to address energy networks security concerns.
7
 Within this approach, 
network security can be conveniently viewed as an extension of performance standards 
and economic regulation of quality of network services.
8
 Incentive regulation of 
network security can then either focus on network security inputs i.e. capital and 
operating costs and network security outputs or performance measures such as the 
number and frequency of long interruptions. This general framework can be used in 
both input-based and output-based regulation.
9
 
 
The policy makers and sector regulators have a few options in disposition. They can 
treat the security costs as a pass through item – i.e. the utility can invest an agreed upon 
amount on security and recover these through its network charges. Alternatively, the 
regulation can treat the security costs as investment and allow the utility to earn a rate of 
return on these. Another option is that the regulator can subject the costs of security 
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improvement to incentive regulation - i.e. to offer economic incentives to achieve a 
desired security level. This can be done by including a new component Q* to the 
conventional price/revenue cap incentive model as in Equation (1). Q* is network 
security adjustment factor that reflects continuity of supply, for example, in terms of 
long unplanned supply interruptions. The allowed price (or revenue) path Pt of the 
company is then directly linked to network security performance where; X is the 
efficiency improvement factor obtained from cost and service quality efficiency 
benchmarking, and RPI is the retail price index.
10
 
 
Pt = Pt-1 (1+ RPI – X+ Q*)    (1) 
 
Within the above approach, network security can be conveniently treated as an 
extension or aspect of quality of service. This is possible because quality of network 
services is already subject to regulation in most countries as an incentivised output or 
through mandatory performance standards.  
 
Network security policy 
In addition to the economic regulation approach, policy makers have another option to 
consider. They can view security of the network infrastructure as a strategic priority for 
national security. This view suggests that the security costs can be covered from the 
national security budget. This approach entails that security costs can be imposed on 
network utilities and paid for by the taxpayer (as opposed to the energy rate payer) in 
line with other defence and security costs. This approach places the coverage of the 
costs beyond economic incentives. 
 
The socio-economic costs of major power supply interruptions from accidental and 
malicious attacks are very high.
11
 Given the heightened expectation of security risk to 
the energy networks, there is broad agreement among the sector regulators and decision 
makers that the security of these networks is a high priority and needs to be maintained.  
 
In the event of major supply disruptions, economic regulation can also help alleviate the 
effect of supply shortages and minimise the economic and welfare effect of these. 
Competitive wholesale and retail energy markets balance the short-term demand and the 
available supply through the price mechanism.
12
 However, contingency plans are 
needed for burden sharing in the event of medium-long term supply interruptions. The 
rational approach to burden sharing is to base these on social welfare and economic cost 
considerations.  
 
The decision makers and regulators need to obtain estimates and decide on the 
appropriate level of investment on network security expenditures. These can be inferred 
from modelling the potential economic and welfare costs of low-probability high-
                                                          
10
 Jamasb, T. and Nepal, R. (2014), Incentive Regulation and Utility Benchmarking for Electricity 
Network Security, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1434 / Energy Policy Research Group 
Working Paper 1413, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. 
11
 Nepal, R. and Jamasb, T. (2013), ‘Security of the European Electricity Systems: Conceptualizing the 
Assessment Criteria and Core Indicators’, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
6(3-4), December, 182-196.  
12
 Jamasb, T. and Pollitt, M. (2008), ‘Security of Supply and Regulation of Energy Networks, Energy 
Policy’, 36(12), December, 4584-4589. 
4 
 
impact incidents.
13
 The social welfare on households can be obtained from survey based 
contingent valuation methods.
14
 For industrial and commercial users, this valuation can 
be based on modelling the cost of major interruptions to economic output taking into 
account the interdependencies among the different groups of users. It should be noted 
that the impacts of supply interruptions on individual industries can vary considerably 
in terms of their physical inoperability as opposed to economic cost due to loss of the 
output.
15
  
 
Conclusions 
 
Security of energy supply and infrastructure is a policy priority for most energy 
policymakers and regulators in both the EU and the USA. A sound regulatory approach 
with regards to network security needs to provide sufficient incentives to improve 
security to prevent outages but also to allocate and manage the supply shortfall in the 
event of major supply failures. However, the regulation of network security can also be 
understood in its wider economic regulation and national policy context. The 
harmonization of network security objectives and intensifying coordination among 
countries will be essential to deliver adequate supply security given its national 
importance and increasing international interdependencies. 
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